

**PROCEEDINGS**

1 about his judgment, his mental health.

2 And, therefore, in terms of visitation, we are asking  
3 the Court follow the recommendation of Mental Health Services  
4 which was that visitation not be resumed until such time as  
5 he demonstrates a willingness and an ability to abide by  
6 court orders of protection -- which he hasn't violated since  
7 the last court date. So that is good -- and demonstrates  
8 understanding of the detrimental effects his actions have had  
9 upon [REDACTED], Ms. Lockard, and the childcare staff of  
10 Rockefeller University. To this day he does not understand  
11 that the childcare staff at Rockefeller University does not  
12 want him there.

13 Actually I will say, Your Honor, I just said he hasn't  
14 violated the orders of protection since the last court date.  
15 I would maintain that the emails that he sent to me are third  
16 part contact although he expressly says in his email that,  
17 "This is not a third party communication to Meghan. It is a  
18 direct communications to you, Jill Zuccardy."

19 So he is still trying to find ways to violate the order  
20 of protection as recently as May. So for those reasons, we  
21 oppose the resumption of his petition at this time until  
22 Mr. Whelan is engaged in mental health services and shows  
23 some acknowledgment of behavior and it's effects on Ms.  
24 Lockard and their child.

25 MR. LEAVIN: Judge, if I may.

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1           Mr. Whelan obviously accepts responsibility for having  
2           violated an order of protection in his guilty plea on the  
3           criminal case. So I think that is totally wrong. He's  
4           agreed to go into a program as you just heard. He's pled  
5           guilty. He will have a criminal record for a misdemeanor.  
6           So he's certainly accepted responsibility for criminal  
7           behavior.

8           Secondly --

9           THE COURT: He hasn't pled guilty yet. He will --

10          MR. LEAVIN: He will.

11          THE COURT: -- according to what I --

12          MR. LEAVIN: He has indicated that he will, and the  
13          People have accepted his guilty plea on the terms --

14          THE COURT: And he hasn't entered a program yet?

15          MR. LEAVIN: Right. Also we have no opposition to  
16          him starting a job log search, a search for jobs. He didn't  
17          have time. I didn't have time to have him prepare for the  
18          Court the efforts he's made so far. He is looking. He's  
19          sending out resumes, he's told me, to banks. He's looking  
20          into working on a book with someone. So he is continuing to  
21          search for jobs in the financial industry and outside as a  
22          Financial Analyst.

23                 I still didn't hear from Ms. Zuccardy any injury or  
24                 damage or threat or problem to the child.

25          THE COURT: Well, I was going to address that.

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1 MR. LEAVIN: So the emails that he sent to Ms.  
2 Zuccardy were in an emotional state. He's absolutely no  
3 threat to her. The reason that he talked about her address  
4 is because when he was pro se they had much communication  
5 directly before I came on the case. He knows her street  
6 because she told him. He absolutely will never, and as I  
7 told her, he never would go there. He said he would never go  
8 there. I told him — told her he said he would never go  
9 there. So I think that is a red herring.

10 The main thing is and his problems with working are both  
11 due to the symptoms, neurological symptoms he describes in  
12 his paper and the fact of the criminal felony charge, not  
13 even a misdemeanor plea, which is now in the financial  
14 industry in his profile, in his FINA, in forms of the  
15 financial industry. So that is a problem for him. But as to  
16 the child, he has never done anything neglectful, abusive,  
17 harmful, nasty, uncareful with the child; and I think for Ms.  
18 Zuccardy to so say because he sent her an email he's a danger  
19 to the child, I think that is absurd.

20 So I would ask the visits be resumed. If Your Honor  
21 wants to first for a short period of time, resume supervised  
22 visits where nothing conceivably can happen to the child then  
23 I think it's the child's right and his right to at least  
24 resume supervised visits because there is no reason not to do  
25 that. There is nothing that can happen to the child in a

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1 supervised visit. Thank you.

2 MS. ZUCCARDY: Just briefly in response, Your  
3 Honor, in terms of the acknowledgment of wrong doing in his  
4 affidavit dated June 9, 2016 Mr. Whelan says, "I explained I  
5 am pleading guilty to handing a baby shoe to my wife in  
6 violation of the restraining order. I have to plead guilty  
7 to it because I admitted it to the arresting office." That's  
8 his admission of wrongdoing.

9 He is still in our view not taking it seriously. The  
10 emails that he sent to me in an emotional state that is the  
11 exactly problem. Mr. Whelan seems to act very often in an  
12 emotional state. So he is unpredictable, and something can  
13 happen in a supervised visit.

14 MR. LEAVIN: I just started to read the hospital  
15 record from a year ago where Ms. Lockard contrary to what Ms.  
16 Zuccardy is arguing to the Court admits that she was violent  
17 toward her husband — this is before her hospitalization —  
18 that she punched him in the face. That she felt guilty about  
19 being a bad mother. I mean I haven't finished these records,  
20 but I just got them. Ms. Zuccardy had them for a number of  
21 time. And they're inconsistency with her portrayal of  
22 herself as a saintly mother and he is the devil. So once we  
23 get all the medical records and counseling records, I submit  
24 that the Court will get a more balanced picture of this  
25 relationship and of these two people.

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1 THE COURT: So your client is not engaged in any  
2 services at this time. Is that correct?

3 MR. LEAVIN: He sees a psychiatrist, Judge.

4 THE COURT: How long has he been seeing a  
5 psychiatrist?

6 MR. LEAVIN: A year and a half.

7 THE COURT: So it predated the allegations in all  
8 of these petitions, his seeing a psychiatrist?

9 MR. LEAVIN: Right. And he was seeing a social  
10 workers at Forestdale in accordance with agreements the  
11 parties made prior to your seeing the case. He was still --

12 THE COURT: Has he been drug tested recently or  
13 every.

14 MR. LEAVIN: He's periodically tested, and they've  
15 all been negative. He's never had a positive alcohol or drug  
16 test.

17 THE COURT: Have those results been turned over to  
18 me. I am not aware of any negative drug test. Who is he  
19 being tested by?

20 MR. LEAVIN: In -- Forestdale is the agency. I  
21 don't know anymore details than that.

22 THE COURT: It says in the mental health eval. that  
23 a previous toxicology screening from February 12th indicated  
24 the presence of alcohol metabolites. He claimed he had used  
25 cough medicine, but he did not reveal this until after the

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1 results were received. And he also had earlier tested  
2 positive for amphetamines which he explains was due to his  
3 use of Adderall.

4 MR. LEAVIN: He has a prescription for Adderall.  
5 And according to him there was seven tests. One test was the  
6 cough medicine allegation.

7 THE COURT: Also contrary to your assertion that  
8 he's never harmed the child in any way, in the same mental  
9 health eval. it says that he went to a hospital and appeared  
10 drunk to hospital staff. He smelled of alcohol and was  
11 stumbling. He also tried to prop up five-month-old Willa who  
12 wiggled and fell off the couch. Hospital staff took her to  
13 the pediatric ER and reported Mr. Whelan's behavior to Child  
14 Protective Services.

15 MR. LEAVIN: Judge, as is on the record when  
16 Mr. Whelan met further with ACS, submitted documents and  
17 explained the situation, that report was considered, was  
18 overturned, was reversed, and was considered sealed as  
19 unfounded.

20 THE COURT: What does that mean? That these facts  
21 never occurred? The child didn't fall off of the couch and  
22 he was not drunk with Willa in the hospital?

23 MR. LEAVIN: That's only what Ms. Lockard said.

24 THE COURT: Ms. Lockard wasn't there. Wasn't she  
25 admitted to the hospital?



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1 MS. ZUCCARDY: Yes.

2 MR. LEAVIN: What she said to ACS subsequent. He  
3 said three hours before he had dinner and had one beer. And  
4 now the allegation — the ridiculous allegation is that he  
5 was drunk three hours later.

6 THE COURT: This is odd then. Here is another  
7 example that supports Ms. Zuccardy's theory that he doesn't  
8 take responsibility because in here it says that, "He  
9 appeared drunk to hospital — according to hospital staff."  
10 Let me just see here.

11 MR. LEAVIN: Judge, ACS in their reversal of these  
12 conclusions he was never tested for alcohol when at the  
13 hospital when he supposedly was holding [REDACTED]. He was never  
14 tested. And based on all of the evidence ACS reversed this  
15 finding — these allegations.

16 THE COURT: So the recommendation, according to the  
17 mental health eval., which is just one of the considerations  
18 by me, is that based upon his disregard of interpersonal  
19 boundaries even while under court order, there is justifiable  
20 concern that he may act inappropriately with his daughters.

21 "At this time, it is not recommended that an observation  
22 of the interaction between Mr. Whelan and [REDACTED] occur given  
23 his propensity to violate the orders of protection and the  
24 sexualized nature of emails that he apparently has sent to  
25 Ms. Lockard and the childcare staff. Suspension of visits

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1 same warranted at this time."

2 MR. LEAVIN: Judge, he was never even charged  
3 criminally with sending any explicit sexual emails which he's  
4 denied from day one.

5 THE COURT: I understand.

6 MR. LEAVIN: And it make no sense to me --

7 THE COURT: I understand. I acknowledge that he  
8 hasn't been charged. And also I don't believe that there was  
9 ever an investigation, and correct me if I am wrong, to  
10 determine the source of those emails.

11 MR. LEAVIN: Exactly.

12 MS. ZUCCARDY: Actually my information, which is  
13 sort of secondhand; but is that there was explanation done  
14 through the anonymous website, and all that came back was  
15 there was a lot of bounces off different servers. So that  
16 it's not able to be proven without significant forensics  
17 assessment where they started from. I don't think the D.A.'s  
18 office has those kinds of resources, and I certainly don't.

19 MR. LEAVIN: So Judge, to say that he's plead to  
20 violating an protection --

21 THE COURT: He hasn't done that yet.

22 MR. LEAVIN: That he said he will plead to a  
23 misdemeanor, violating an order of protection against Ms.  
24 Lockard. For then for that forensics person to say he  
25 shouldn't even observe Mr. Whelan with his daughter to



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1 determine if there is inappropriate behavior. That is just  
2 bizarre. What is the harm to anyone if this so-called  
3 Forensics observes Mr. Whelan with his daughter and then make  
4 a determination about how he responds.

5 THE COURT: I don't know. But my concern is right  
6 now, first of all, there are a lot of variables that are not  
7 in place.

8 He hasn't pled which is what you are purporting to be a  
9 consideration by this Court. He is not in a program. I  
10 understand that on the criminal case a program is being  
11 considered. There is a lot of sexualization going on in the  
12 context of this case which really is very disturbing,  
13 pedophilia, you know, in that range.

14 With respect to these emails, I do not know the source  
15 of the emails. It hasn't been proven that your client is the  
16 source. But I find it interesting that the emails were sent  
17 to the wife to her place of employment. It doesn't seem  
18 likely that she would send these types of emails to herself  
19 to jeopardize her own employment status. Just in terms of  
20 the logical inference is that she would not send these emails  
21 to herself to jeopardize her own employment and reputation at  
22 her place of work.

23 MR. LEAVIN: She sent them to him.

24 THE COURT: That is an allegation that they were  
25 sent to him according to -- and others. So that the emails

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1 was sent to not just her but also her colleagues. The bottom  
2 line is this:

3 I'm not going to grant any type of supervision -- any  
4 type of visitation at this time, supervised or otherwise.  
5 The outstanding allegations are very disturbing. I would  
6 like to see your client in a program.

7 The criminal allegations are also disturbing. They show  
8 an escalation of your client's behavior, stalking behavior  
9 which as we all know is an indicator, a very negative  
10 indicator of lethality with respect to that type of behavior.

11 I am also concerned that he is sending emails -- he sent  
12 emails to opposing counsel. And the content of those emails  
13 were quite disturbing, very disturbing using cursing in one  
14 and also acknowledging where Ms. Zuccardy lives and also the  
15 hour, 1:48 in the morning or 1:47 in the morning. What he is  
16 doing up early in the morning that odd hour sending emails to  
17 an attorney that doesn't represent him that represents his  
18 wife?

19 There is something very disturbing about his pattern of  
20 behavior and it's not just one thing. It's a whole community  
21 of issues that are swirling around your client that gives me  
22 pause and makes me concerned about reinstating any type of  
23 visitation at this point.

24 After he gets himself into a program and he gets  
25 engaged, perhaps I will change the order of protection order.

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1 And you have leave to make another application for visitation  
2 to resume, but he needs to be engaged in something that is  
3 addressing some of these very serious issues and his  
4 inability to control himself and the way he is very  
5 compulsive. I mean to send emails at 1:47 in the morning to  
6 a lawyer that is kind of disturbing. That is a bit  
7 disturbing on top of his other behavior.

8 MR. LEAVIN: As I've argued and as you know, they  
9 were in direct contact for many months prior to his retaining  
10 me.

11 THE COURT: Okay. And now he has a lawyer. He's  
12 been in court. It was after his court appearance. He knows  
13 that Ms. Zuccardy doesn't represent him. And he knows this is  
14 an adversarial procedure. He knows he shouldn't be sending  
15 Ms. Zuccardy emails, but he couldn't control himself. He did  
16 it anyway. He was up at one something in the morning out of  
17 control, angry and decided to fire off a few emails to  
18 opposing counsel.

19 MR. LEAVIN: I hear you, Judge. I would just add  
20 he's never been violent or threatened violence or been  
21 accused of being violent. So I would just ask you to take  
22 that into account when interrupting the relationship between  
23 their child and the father.

24 THE COURT: He last five pending misdemeanor  
25 cases -- five pending cases. I said misdemeanors. I believe

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1 one of them is a felony. He has five pending cases. That  
2 show a pattern of escalating, stalking behavior and disregard  
3 for court orders, a total disregard for court orders.

4 MR. LEAVIN: I understand the allegations against  
5 the mother, against the mother.

6 THE COURT: I understand. All right. I understand  
7 that you're objecting to the ruling, but the ruling is what  
8 it is.

9 MR. LEAVIN: How about child support, Judge, the  
10 financial?

11 THE COURT: I have to issue a written decision  
12 regarding that.

13 MS. ZUCCARDY: May I then -- Withdrawn.

14 THE COURT: So let me give you a date.

15 MR. LEAVIN: Judge, can I just say my client has  
16 asked you to recuse yourself from the case on the grounds  
17 that you're not treating him fairly.

18 THE COURT: Denied.

19 MR. LEAVIN: Thank you.

20 MS. ZUCCARDY: Your Honor, my client has brought to  
21 my attention, and I want to make sure it's on record, that my  
22 client has been contacted by the I.R.S.

23 Apparently in 2014 there was liquidation of a Vanguard  
24 retirement account that Mr. Whelan did not declare on their  
25 taxes. So I wanted to put it on the record so that

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1 Mr. Leavin is very clear that this is happening.

2 My client has filed for "Innocent Spouse Relief" and I  
3 apologize for not putting that in my oral argument. But we  
4 do think it's a factor that that happened without her  
5 knowledge and without declaration to the I.R.S.

6 MR. LEAVIN: And, Judge. I have emails from their  
7 accountant which is not consistent with what Ms. Zuccardy  
8 said. She said it was a mutual problem and there was  
9 circumstances where Ms. Lockard refused to contribute to the  
10 rent. They discussed and she agreed that he take money out  
11 of his retirement fund. This is back in the 2014 joint  
12 returns.

13 THE COURT: September 12th at 9:30.

14 MR. LEAVIN: Can we do it any sooner, Judge?

15 THE COURT: I don't have any other dates due to the  
16 summer vacation schedules. And also I have a lot of cases on  
17 and I really need -- I have an audience full of people right  
18 now that have cases that need to be heard. I have a very,  
19 very, very busy schedule and I don't have any sooner dates.

20 MR. LEAVIN: I understand, Judge.

21 Just on the visitation issue once he gets into a program  
22 and does plead guilty which is presumably going to happen in  
23 a couple of weeks --

24 THE COURT: So that will leave time for me to  
25 review his progress in the program and see how he's doing in

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1 the program. He would have been in the program hopefully and  
2 we'll see how he's doing, progressing in the program.  
3 September 12th.

4 MR. LEAVIN: Thank you.

5 THE COURT: September 12th at 9:30.

6 MS. ZUCCARDY: Is that for control or for hearing?

7 THE COURT: Bring your witness lists on that day.

8 I will select fact finding dates at that time and that is for  
9 Motion Sequence 3.

10 MS. ZUCCARDY: Thank you.

11 THE COURT: Witness list. With your witness lists  
12 just describe your witness's testimony using one or two lines  
13 indicating what you hope that you will bring out in their  
14 testimony.

15 MS. ZUCCARDY: Thank you.

16 MR. LEAVIN: Thank you.

17 Judge, in the papers my client has asked that Ms.  
18 Lockard pay for his medical treatment based on neurological  
19 symptoms, brain damages based on violence by Ms. Lockard to  
20 him a year ago.

21 THE COURT: I will review the papers and make a  
22 determinations with respect to the motion.

23 (THIS SPACE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY)  
24  
25




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MR. LEAVIN: Thank you.

MS. ZUCCARDY: Thank you.

\* \* \* \* \*

THE ABOVE IS CERTIFIED TO BE A  
TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT OF  
THE TESTIMONY AS TAKEN BY ME.

  
AMALIA HUDSON  
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

RECEIVED

Case 3:16-cv-02948-PGS-LHG

JUL 06 2016

**Supplemental Arguments**

AT 8:30 \_\_\_\_\_M  
WILLIAM T. WALSH  
CLERK

1. The logic of my request for reconsideration is two-fold. One reason for reconsideration is that I think the reasons and precedents cited for dismissal are not logically sound. My prior paperwork, as well as item 5 of this document, enumerate my explanations for this part of my reasoning. The second reason is that I believe there has been an inappropriate elision of the bifurcated questions of custody questions and visitation questions. I will describe what I mean in items 6-12. Lastly, I am going to explain that there is no countervailing interest in state court that would justify dismissal or abstention in items 13-18. Summary of the broad logic given in item 19 as conclusion.
2. To clarify the relief I seek, I would like AT LEAST to return to the routine visitation schedule with my daughter delineated in Judge Lori Sattler's Court. In her Court, my wife and I formally agreed that I would pick up my daughter for a visit from 5:00 P. M.- 7:00 P. M. on Wednesdays and Fridays AND I would pick her up at noon on Sundays then drop her off with my wife at 6:45 P. M. the same day. There was never any problem or incident with this routine other than that my wife accused me (falsely) of cursing at her during hand-offs. That supposed issue can be remedied by having hand-offs at the local police precinct and/or having one of my family members do the hand-off instead of myself.
3. Ideally, I would simply pick my daughter up from her daycare on Fridays at 5:00 P. M. and drop her off at the daycare on Mondays at 9:00 A. M. That would circumvent the possibility that my wife and I would interact, and I would get to spend an appropriate amount of time with my daughter.
4. AT THE VERY LEAST, supervised visitation at the CFS facility, which I was allowed from January-March of 2016, should be restored. There was never any incident or problem with those visits.
5. Against the citation of the Colorado water rights case as basis for relegating this case to state court, the ruling on May v. Anderson 345 US 528, 541 states, "The difference between a proceeding involving the status, custody, and support of children and one involving adjudication of property rights is too apparent to require elaboration." I am appending the entirety of that proceeding to this filing.
6. I am not asking that the District Court get involved in making a custody decision. The question of custody, in the legal sense, has fallen by the wayside because I have had to fight tooth and nail for routine visitation rights.
7. My struggle for a rational visitation routine began in the summer of 2015 when my wife and I were separated. Her neurosis led to increasingly strict requests, including that I use a breathalyzer when I picked up my daughter to show her that I had not been drinking AND requiring the presence of one of my family members during the visit. Her strictures

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became so absurd that I went to Family Court to file an OSC to normalize visitation. This was before I had retained counsel.

8. As I was organizing my paperwork in the New York State Family Court waiting area, Jill Zuccardy, my wife's lawyer, happened to call me. I described what I was doing to Ms. Zuccardy, and she said that, while she did not know exactly what I was filing, I should not file anything until I had sought legal counsel. She effectively advised me against filing the OSC, and thereafter Ms. Zuccardy and my wife intensified their efforts to restrict my visitation privileges.
9. There never was any incident where I endangered nor neglected my daughter. Knowing this, and realizing that my wife has a mental health history including psychosis, Judge Lori Sattler's Court eventually instituted the visitation routine described in item 2 above. This was done against the wishes of my wife and Ms. Zuccardy because of nebulous fears for my daughter's safety. Their concerns have remained nebulous and unspecified, although my lawyer has repeatedly asked Ms. Zuccardy what they fear and what would alleviate those fears.
10. Essentially all of the cases that I cite concerning parental constitutional rights use the term "custody" with reference to constitutional protections. There is, as I mentioned in item 1, an ambiguous usage of the term "custody" that encompasses visitation AND parental contact. I am not even asking for a technical custody order. All I am asking is that I be allowed to have routine visits with my daughter for her sake and for mine.
11. Wild accusations abound in divorce hearings. If those accusations are allowed to be grounds for child deprivation, then every child whose parents are getting divorced ought to be put into foster care indefinitely. There has never been any allegation of child endangerment nor of child harm nor of child abuse against me that was found to be legitimate.
12. In the Interest of Cooper, 621 P 2d 437; 5 Kansas App Div 2d 584 states that a parent who is deprived of custody of his or her child, even temporarily, suffers thereby grievous loss and such loss deserves extensive due process protection. I have not been granted any due process protection, and yet Judge Dawson says she will only reconsider whether or not I can have contact with my daughter on September 12, 2016. I have not seen my daughter since March 2016.
13. Just as my rights are being violated, Judge Dawson is routinely violating the constitutional rights of the people who enter her court in similar ways according to anecdotes I have heard.
14. Technically, a countervailing interest is supposed to be equal and proportionate to be considered countervailing. In tort law theory, the concern for a child's safety and the concern for preservation of the parent-child relationship can be countervailing interests IF the parent abuses the child. HOWEVER, I have never abused my child nor have I ever neglected my child nor have I ever even endangered my child.

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15. The only countervailing interest against the preservation of the parent-child relationship in my situation is the hysteria that my wife presents to Judge Dawson's court. Having no correlate with anything in objective reality, that hysteria is either grounded in paranoia or vindictiveness. Since the countervailing interest has not been subjected to due process nor could it be.
16. In Judge Dawson's court, Ms. Zuccardy spouts false narratives that my mentally ill wife has cast over her memories. These false, unproven narratives are either born of vindictiveness, the desire to control visitation because my wife's control issues, or the fact that my wife cannot live with the shame of having been an abusive spouse that endangered our child with her abuse and mental illness. Frankly, it does not even matter why they propagate unproven, unproveable, and mostly uninvestigated (the one accusation that was investigated was ruled unfounded) accusations. What matters is that Judge Dawson believes the accusations and has taken away my constitutional right to my parent-child relationship without any effort at a swift due process hearing to justify doing so. Her plan is to re-assess on September 12, 2016.
17. If the unproven paranoid projections of a person with a history of psychosis are a countervailing interest in this case, AND that countervailing interest is considered a grounds for dismissal of my plea to reclaim my constitutional right to my daughter's and my parent-child relationship, then I am genuinely confused about how our court system is fulfilling its mandate of upholding the constitutional rights of American citizens. The denial of personal rights out of excessive concern for safety is generally not supported by the spirit of the law nor historical rulings of the upper courts. In fact, such deprivation of rights without due process is generally explicitly denounced by Supreme Court justices.
18. Furthermore, denial of contact with a parent is known to cause life-long psychological damage to a child. Nominally, my daughter's safety is the countervailing interest that might be cited as grounds for the District Court to dismiss or abstain from considering this case. I grudgingly abided the paranoid restriction of visitation to the CFS supervision facility from January-March of 2016 before visitation was disallowed altogether. Not only that, the supervisory staff found my parenting to be proficient, Disallowing parental contact NOT ONLY has no countervailing interest grounds BUT ALSO shows that in fact deprivation of the parent-child relationship is demonstrably harmful more than helpful.
19. Congress will not even agree to restrict Second Amendment rights of individuals who are on the No-Fly-List because being added to that list does not require a due process hearing. Is it more meaningful to our government to maintain the right to gun ownership than the right to a parent-child relationship? There is no grounds for dismissal nor for abstention of the upper courts in this situation of ongoing constitutional rights violation.

*I certify the truth  
and accuracy  
of these statements.*

*Steven Whelan* 7/6/2016  
Steven Whelan

# EXHIBIT B

Details of Complaint

Judge Dawson has acted in violation of Article 28 of U. S. Code 455 subsections (a) and (b)(1). She has demonstrated certainty about disputed evidentiary material facts in the cases. She has shown in her words and orders that she believes me to be guilty of untried allegations based on the hearsay of the Plaintiff and Ms. Zuccardy (Plaintiff's counsel) that I deny.

The criminal and family court cases were consolidated into Judge Dawson's Court and heard there for the first time in January of 2016. Based on unproven non-violent contempt of court claims (the substance of which was that I had accidentally passed the Plaintiff on the street twice) AND false, unproven allegations that I am an irresponsible driver AND false, unevicenced claims that I had have endangered and neglected my daughter AND false claims about my home being an unsafe environment for a child AND claims that I am an alcoholic AND their allegation that I had made a frivolous ACS complaint against the Plaintiff, Judge Dawson ordered my visits with my daughter limited to Comprehensive Family Services visits for a maximum weekly four hours. Plaintiff and her attorney, Jill Zuccardy, failed to evidence the claim that I am an unsafe driver because I have not been at fault in an accident for the past 15 years despite driving almost every day, sometimes for hours around New York City. A woman from Deyfus was sent to report to ACS on the safety of my home, and she affirmed that it is a safe environment for my one year old daughter to visit. The contempt of court charges are still pending disposition on October 11, 2016. Judge Dawson first postponed my plea deal multiple times starting on April 1, 2016. I am not an alcoholic, and their argument to the contrary is